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Abstract
We study the emergence of altruistic behaviour in collective games. In particular,
we take into account Toral’s version of collective Parrondo’s paradoxical games, in
which the redistribution of capital between agents, who can play different strate-
gies, creates a positive trend of increasing capital. In this framework, we insert two
categories of players, altruistic and selfish ones, and see how they interact and how
their capital evolves. More in detail, we analyse the positive effects of altruistic
behaviour, but we also point out how selfish players take advantage of that situa-
tion. The general result is that altruistic behaviour is discouraged, because selfish
players get richer while altruistic ones get poorer. We also consider a smarter way
of being altruistic, based on reputation, called “selective altruism”, which prevents
selfish players from taking advantage of altruistic ones. In this new situation it is
altruism, and not selfishness, to be encouraged and stabilized. Finally, we introduce
a mechanism of imitation between players and study how it influences the compo-
sition of the population of both altruistic and selfish players as a function of time
for different initial conditions and network topologies adopted.
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Introduction
Everyday we observe several examples of altruistic behaviour in the world
around us, at different levels of complexity. Within a single organism, cells co-
ordinate to keep control over their division and avoid the emergence of cancer.
Structures that we observe in the organism (organs, systems) are the conse-
quence of some kind of cooperative behaviour at cellular level. Coordination
and cooperation occur also within animal societies: for example, worker ants
sacrifice their own fecundity and do not reproduce in order to serve their queen
and colony, while, in a pride of lions, adult females nurse not only their own
cubs but also those of other females. Humans help each other in many ways:
we see small actions of cooperation in every day life, but also heroic acts like
those of the workers of Fukushima nuclear power plant, who re-entered the
contaminated building trying to bring things back under control.
From the point of view of Darwinian evolution, it seems difficult to understand
why such behaviour can exist and be so common. In fact, biological evolution
is selection and struggle to survive and reproduce. Why should one help an-
other individual, risking to lower his own reproductive success for the benefit
of someone else? How cooperative and altruistic behaviour emerge and diffuse
in nature?
Kin selection and inclusive fitness are a first possible explanation of these
phenomena [1,2], even if restricted to forms of altruism toward close relatives,
which are advantageous since they result to increase the individual’s genetic
contribution to the next generation. Another possible mechanism able to an-
swer the previous question lies in the key concept of repeated encounters [3].
If two individuals meet once with no chance of meeting again, the best choice
for both is obviously to defect, since they have no reason to trust each other
and face the risk to be betrayed. But, in a group where individuals often meet
one another, the perspective drastically changes. If they help one another in
the moments of need, all of them have an advantage. This is the basis of the
so called “tit for tat” strategy, frequent in human and animal societies [4].
In this respect, there is also a strong evidence that natural selection operates
among groups, as well as among individuals. It turns out that groups in which
cooperating behaviour is present are favoured over groups of totally selfish
individuals [5]. That is possibly why altruistic behaviour emerge and diffuse.
In the past years, altruism has been also analysed with the help of simple
mathematical models and simulations, often in the context of game theory.
Among the many studies going in this direction, we may cite the work of
Sigmund[6], Nowak [7], Gintis [8] and Helbing [9,10,11]. Along this line, in the
present paper we focus on a collective version of Parrondo’s games [14]. In par-
ticular, we consider here a variant of this model, developed by Toral [29], where
we introduce altruistic and selfish players. We investigate how the action of
altruistic players can create a positive condition for the whole community, but
we also see how selfish players can take advantage of that situation, creating
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in the long run a negative condition for the community. In order to investigate
how to prevent this bad outcome and explain the emergence of altruism in
real situations, we introduce a new and more refined way of being altruistic,
which we call selective altruism, inspired by the mechanism of indirect reci-
procity. Then we explore through extensive numerical simulations the effects
that it produces, also finding the conditions for its diffusion over the entire
population.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we briefly recap Parrondo’s
paradox and some collective versions of Parrondo’s games, focusing on Toral’s
one. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of altruism and elaborate a new
specific model, called Altruism-Selfishness (AS) model, to take it into account.
Then, in Section 3, in order to improve this naive altruistic strategy, we dis-
cuss a new model, the Selective Altruism-Selfishness (SAS) model, where we
introduce a selective altruistic behaviour. In Section 4 we study the effects
of imitation among players in a community of fully interacting individuals.
Finally, in Section 5, we extend the previous analysis to several communities
of players with different network topologies, comparing the simulation results.
Conclusions and final considerations close the paper.
1 Parrondo’s paradox in single and collective games
Parrondo’s paradox [12,13,14] is a counterintuitive behaviour that takes place
in the context of game theory and represents one of the numerous examples of
systems where noise and randomness can play a beneficial role [15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22].
In particular, Parrondo showed that two losing games can result in a winning
trend when played in an alternating or in a random sequence by a single player.
The games originally described by Parrondo are schematized in Figure 1.
• Game A consists in a slightly biased coin, with a probability of winning that
is less than one half (more precisely 1/2− ).
• Game B, on the other hand, consists in two coins, a ‘bad’ one (with a
winning probability of 1/10−) and a ‘good’ one (with a winning probability
of 3/4−): the player tosses the bad coin if his capital is a multiple of three,
otherwise he tosses the good coin.
As a consequence of game A or B, at each turn the player can win or lose
a unit of capital competing against a casino. It can be proven that the two
games, taken singularly, are fair if  = 0 and losing if  > 0. However, a player
that alternates (periodically or randomly) the two games (starting from a zero
capital) has, on average, a capital that increases with the number of turns,
even for small positive values of . This apparent paradox has been explained
by an analogy between the gambling game and a 1-dimensional Brownian mo-
tion under the action of a flashing potential [14]. Besides, the paradox can be
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Fig. 1. Parrondo’s games. Rules of the two original Parrondo’s games A and B,
for a single player. Depending on the game and on his capital, the player has to toss
a coin with a certain probability of winning and of losing. The darkness of each coin
represents its ‘badness’ for the player.
explained from another point of view: the ‘profitability’ of game B depends on
the probability pi0 that the capital is a multiple of three. It can be seen that
game A lowers the value of pi0. In other words, game A reduces the number of
times that the bad coin is used in game B, making it more profitable.
There are also collective versions of Parrondo’s games that produce paradox-
ical results [23,24,25,26,27,28]. More specifically, in refs. [23,24], the authors
show that if every player chooses which game to play aiming only at his own
profit, all the community ends up losing capital. On the other hand, in ref. [25]
it is shown that, if the players choose only for the immediate benefit of the
community in the present turn, they still produce a losing trend. In those
cases, it can be seen that chosing randomly between two games or two be-
havioural patterns avoids falling in the trap of an apparently optimal strategy
and produces a winning result.
An interesting collective variant of this scheme, also producing paradoxical
results, was introduced by Toral [29]. In the capital dependent version of this
model (labelled as version I’ in Toral’s paper), depicted in Figure 2, at each
turn just one player Pi, in a community of N individuals {Pi}i=1,2,...,N , is ran-
domly selected for playing and he has to play one of two games. Game B is
the same as in the original Parrondo’s version, whereas game A consists in
the selected player Pi giving away one unit of his capital to another player
Pj who is randomly chosen. Game A does not change collective capital, it
just redistributes it among the players. Game B is losing when played alone,
as we already know. The striking result is that, if players randomly alternate
between A and B choosing with a probability of 1/2 for both, they asymp-
totically increase their capital. This behaviour is evident in Figure 3, where
we can see the results of simulations for a Toral’s game with N = 10, 000
fully interacting players (i.e. each player can exchange his capital with anyone
else). The explanation for this paradoxical effect goes along the same lines of
the original game: the redistribution of capital lowers the value of pi0, making
game B more profitable. This means that the redistribution of capital can
4
Fig. 2. Toral’s games. Rules of Toral’s games A and B, for a community of N
players. Depending on the game and on his capital, the player has to toss a coin with
a certain probability of winning and of losing. The darkness of each coin represents
its ‘badness’ for the player.
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Fig. 3. Toral’s games. Average capital per player as a function of time (turns
per player), in Toral’s collective version of Parrondo’s games. We can see how
the average capital, starting from zero, evolves in time when all the players play
game A, when they play game B and when they randomly alternate between the
two. The simulations have been performed with N = 10, 000 players and  = 0.005,
and data have been also averaged over 100 different realizations. See text for further
details.
turn a losing game into a winning game and increase the total capital of the
collective group. In this case, “capital redistribution brings wealth”. In the
next section we will propose a reinterpretation of Toral’s collective game in
terms of selfish versus altruistic behaviour and we will start to explore the
consequences of such assumption.
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Fig. 4. AS model. Rules of our modified version of Toral’s collective games for a
community of N players. Selfish players play only game B, while altruistic players
randomly alternate between game A and game B.
2 Altruism and its effects: the AS model
Altruistic behaviour is a topic largely debated in the scientific literature. In
particular, there is significant interest in studies dealing with the emergence
of cooperative behaviour, in which the single agent sacrifices his personal gain
for the gain of all the others [7,9,10]. To introduce the concept of altruism in
this game context, let us look at Toral’s model from another point of view.
It is clear that, from the perspective of a single player, game A is invariably a
losing game: the player loses a unit of capital, donating it to another player.
On the other hand, game B has some chances of winning: the player competes
against a casino and can win or lose a unit of capital. So, if a player had to
choose between the two games caring only for himself, he would have no reason
to choose A. In this respect, we may consider the case in which players play
only game B as a selfish behaviour: no one wants to lose capital for the benefit
of the community. On the other hand, we may regard the case in which players
randomly alternate between A and B as an altruistic behaviour: players still
play against a casino to increase their capital, but from time to time they
sacrifice their personal wealth to favour the game of other players.
Following these interpretations, in this section we will introduce and study a
modified version of Toral’s model in order to test our intuitions and answer
some questions about the stability of altruistic behaviour. We will refer to this
model as Altruism-Selfishness (AS) model and we schematically illustrate it
in Figure 4. Let us consider a community of N fully interacting players taking
part in the game at the same time and distributed into two classes:
• altruistic players, indicated as {Ai}i=1,2,...,Na , who alternate randomly be-
tween game A and game B, so that they can choose from time to time the
losing option only to help another player;
• selfish players, indicated as {Si}i=1,2,...,Ns , who play only game B, because
they do not want to give away a part of their capital.
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Fig. 5. AS model. Time evolution of the average capital C¯(t), for different val-
ues (indicated in the legend) of the fraction f of altruistic players. Here we have
N = 10, 000 players and T = 100 turns per player. The parameter of Parrondo’s
games is  = 0.005. The results have been also averaged over 50 realizations.
Of course, Na + Ns = N . Each player has an initial capital Ci(0) = 0 (i =
1, 2, . . . , N) that will change in time depending on the played game. Time
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T is a discrete variable indicating the number of played turns
(during each turn, all the players play their games in a random order).
2.1 Impact of a fraction of altruistic players
Using this newly built model, the first point we want to investigate is what
happens when only some of the players are altruistic. Is it necessary that all the
players are altruistic in order to have a winning trend for the collective group?
We are interested in calculating how the average capital C¯(t) = 1
N
∑N
i=1Ci(t)
evolves in time as a function of the (fixed) fraction f = Na/N of altruistic
players present in the community. In Figure 5 we show the results of a first
set of simulations for a community with N = 10, 000 players and for several
increasing values of the fraction f . The case f = 0 (i.e. only selfish players,
Ns = N) is equivalent to playing only game B in Toral’s model, therefore we
observe the expected linear decrease of the average capital C¯(t) as a function of
time. On the other hand, the case f = 1 (i.e. only altruistic players, Na = N)
corresponds to the random alternation of A and B for all the players in Toral’s
model, thus it produces, after a short decreasing transient, a linearly increasing
average capital. For intermediate values of f , we see that the slopes of the
straight lines increase almost continuously when the value of f grows. The
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value f ∼ 0.2 behaves like a threshold: below that value, the slope is negative
and the average capital is decreasing (the game is losing for the collective
group); above that value, the slope becomes positive and the average capital
starts to increase (the game is collectively winning). Summarizing, even a small
fraction of altruistic players seems sufficient to influence all the community
with its positive effects, making the game winning for the collective group and
producing an increasing collective capital. In other words, if just a few players
donate part of their own capital, one observes a movement of wealth within
the community sufficient to lower the value of pi0 and make game B winning.
2.2 Disadvantages of being altruistic
Once we have verified the positive effects of the presence of altruistic players,
one could ask another question: while altruistic players give an advantage to
the collective group considered as a whole (i.e. they produce an increase of
the average capital per player), what happens to the two categories of players
(selfish and altruistic ones) if we analyse them separately?
To give a first answer to this question, we studied the case in which half of the
players are altruistic and half are selfish (i.e. Na = Ns = N/2, or in other terms
f = 0.5). Then, we calculated the evolution of the average capital C¯(t) of the
collective group, as well as the average capital of both altruistic and selfish
players taken separately. The results are reported in Figure 6, where a total
of T = 40 turns per player have been considered. The average capital of the
collective group shows a small increase, of the order expected for f = 0.5 on
the basis of the results of Figure 5. But it clearly appears that this increment
is a compromise between a sudden rise of selfish players’ average capital and
a specular decrease of altruistic players’ one. This also means that the flow of
capital from the altruistic group towards the selfish one clearly prevails on the
average collective capital gain obtained from playing game B.
To better understand the equilibrium of capital between players, as a next step
we calculated the average gain of capital G¯C(f) over 100 turns as function of
different values of the fraction f of altruists in the players community. For a
given f , it is defined as G¯C = C¯(110) − C¯(10), i.e. it simply consists in the
difference between the average capital at turn 110 and at turn 10 (we started
from time 10 to avoid the short initial transient of decreasing capital observed
in Figures 5 and 6). We let f vary from 0 to 1 and for each value of f we
calculated the corresponding average gain of the collective group and of the
two categories of players. We can take a look at the results in Figure 7.
As we could expect from the results of Figure 5, the average gain of the collec-
tive group is slightly negative for small values of f (f < 0.2) and positive for
high values of f . When f = 0, all the players are selfish (Ns = N), therefore
the average gain of the selfish group is exactly equal to the average gain of
the collective group, i.e. slightly less than zero. In this case, we have no data
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Fig. 6. AS model. Time evolution of the average capital of three groups: the col-
lective group, altruistic players and selfish players. As usual,  = 0.005 and we have
N = 10, 000 players, half of which are altruistic and half are selfish. The results have
been also averaged over 100 realizations, each one with T = 40 turns per player.
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Fig. 7. AS model. Average gain over 100 turns as a function of the fraction f of
altruistic players. We report the average gain of the collective group, together with
that of the two categories of players. The fraction f varies from 0 to 1 with steps of
0.01. There are N = 10, 000 players taking part in the game, with  = 0.005. The
results are also averaged over 100 realizations.
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for the gain of the altruists. On the other hand, when f = 1, all the players
are altruistic (Na = N) and the positive gain of the altruistic group is equal
to the gain of the collective group, while there is no data for selfish players.
For a wide range of intermediate values of f , we can see that selfish players
have a big average gain (much bigger than the average gain of the collective
group), whereas altruistic players have a big loss of the same order. The gain
of the selfish increases with increasing values of f because for large values of f
there are few selfish receivers surrounded by many altruistic contributors, so
the capital received by each selfish player Si is big. On the other hand, when
there are many altruists who randomly donate capital, a large fraction of the
donations goes from an altruist Ai to another altruist Aj, so the altruists have
collectively a small loss of capital due to donations. We can see that, when f
is bigger than about 0.95, the altruists finally have a small positive gain.
In order to better analyse this result, the gain of capital of the two categories
of players can be thought as the sum of two distinct contributions. We know
that the action of the altruists gives a collectively winning trend because, re-
distributing the capital, it lowers the value of pi0 and makes game B profitable.
But, apart from the general winning trend of game B, there is a net movement
of capital from altruistic players to selfish ones, due to game A (played only
by altruists). As a consequence, for a wide range of values of f , while the
altruists have a small gain due to game B (that remains profitable thanks to
their actions), they have a much greater loss due to game A (the altruistic
action). On the other hand, selfish players have a small gain due to game B
(the same way as altruists have) and a big gain due to the donations of the
altruists. To say it shortly, altruistic players favour the community at their
own expense, while selfish players receive all the advantages without making
any effort.
3 Selective altruism: the SAS model
The situation that we have just described seems therefore to encourage self-
ishness: the defection of just one player among many altruistic cooperators
(i.e. Ai → Si) wouldn’t almost affect the total redistribution of capital, but
the newly selfish defector would have an individual drastic advantage. The
problem is that if everyone follows this line of reasoning and turns into a self-
ish player, the community would end up with no altruists, which means that
there would be no more capital movements, a situation that makes game B
not profitable, so ultimately everyone would lose capital. Is there a way to
prevent this behaviour? Or, in other terms, is there another less naive way
to be altruist, a way which favours the community without suffering personal
disadvantages?
Among many types of collaborative behaviours, we found a particularly in-
10
Fig. 8. SAS model. New rules for our collective model including the indirect reci-
procity mechanism. Selfish players play only game B, while selective altruistic play-
ers randomly alternate between game A and game B, but they can give capital only
to other selective altruistic players.
teresting mechanism called indirect reciprocity that fosters the emergence of
cooperation [7]. This mechanism occurs when an individual chooses whether
to help or not another individual basing his decision on the reputation of
the individual needing help. Those who have a reputation for giving aid to
others who need it are more likely to receive help from a generous stranger
when they find themselves in hard times. In order to include the mechanism
of indirect reciprocity in our model of fully interacting players, we restrict to
the case in which everyone knows who is altruistic and who is selfish. In this
case, who chooses to cooperate wants to do it only with other players who are
cooperating. In practical terms, playing game A, each altruistic player Ai can
give capital only to another altruistic player Aj. That is what we call selective
altruism, in contrast to naive altruism that we have seen in the previous sec-
tions. We will refer to this new model as Selective Altruism-Selfishness (SAS)
model and we present it in Figure 8. So, what are the results of such a be-
haviour?
To find out a first answer, we study the case in which half of the players are
selectively altruistic and half are selfish (Na = Ns = N/2). In this case, we
calculate the evolution of the average capital of the collective group and that
of the two categories of players. The results are displayed in Figure 9. Here we
can see that the situation is drastically different from what we observed for
AS model in Figure 6. The average capital of the collective group continues to
have a small positive trend, but now altruistic players have an increasing av-
erage capital, while selfish players have a decreasing capital. Anyway, in both
cases the overall variation is quite small, nearly ten times smaller than that
one we observed in Figure 6 for the capitals of the two categories. It means
that there is no flow of capital between the two categories and the variations
of capital are now due only to game B, therefore they are much slower than
before.
To better understand the case of selective altruism, we varied the fraction f of
altruistic players from 0 to 1 and calculated the corresponding average gains
11
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Fig. 9. SAS model. Time evolution of the average capital of three groups: the collec-
tive group, selective altruistic players and selfish players. We consider a community
of N = 10, 000 players, half of which are selectively altruistic and half are selfish.
The results are averaged over 100 realizations. As usual,  = 0.005.
(over 100 turns) of the collective group and of the two categories of players.
The results of these calculations are presented in Figure 10. As we could ex-
pect, the gain of altruistic players is positive, whereas the one of selfish players
is negative. The gains of the two categories remain almost constant in all the
range of values of f and, again, their absolute values are much smaller than
the analogous ones in AS model shown in Figure 7.
The explanation for this trend is quite simple. Selective altruists exchange cap-
ital only between them, creating a sort of network of mutual aid which does
not communicate with the rest of the players. Independently of the number of
altruists, their mutual exchange of capital ensures that game B is profitable
and gives to all of them the same probability of winning. So, the average gain
of the altruists does not change with their number. On the other hand, selfish
players do not take part in the exchange of capital: they do not donate to
anyone, but also do not receive from anyone. Now, each of them has a capital
that changes only as a consequence of game B, that we know to be losing if
played singularly. So, all the selfish players have the same probability of losing
and their negative average gain does not depend on their number. In any case,
there is no movement of capital from one category to the other and the only
source of gain (or loss) for the average capital of the two categories is game B.
That is why we do not see the great values of gain that we saw in the case
of AS model. Finally, we can see that the average gain of the collective group
grows almost linearly since, for increasing values of f , there are more and more
altruistic players in the community, who more and more positively influence
12
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Fig. 10. SAS model. Average gain over 100 turns of the collective group, together
with that of the two categories of players. The fraction of selective altruistic players
is varied from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.01. There are N = 10, 000 players that take
part in the game, with  = 0.005. The results are averaged over 100 realizations.
the final outcome.
4 Effects of imitation in AS and SAS models
Another interesting is whether and how altruistic behaviour spreads among a
population. Why should people choose to help each other and cooperate rather
than take advantage of possible altruists, pursuing their own profit? In more
detail, in a model with selfish and altruistic players and some mechanism by
which players can change their own behaviour, we want to understand what
could be the final result: will one of the two categories prevail on the other
one? Or will there be a form of equilibrium between them?
In [9], Helbing and Yu studied how social cooperation can arise spontaneously,
based on local interactions rather than centralized control. They found that
cooperation can survive or even emerge under adverse conditions, thanks to
imitation and success-driven migration. In that framework, the fundamental
process is the organization of cooperators in clusters, which grant them higher
payoff and allow them to survive and even grow in number thanks to imi-
tation by other players. Similarly, in [7] Nowak describes some mechanisms
by which cooperation can emerge. Particularly interesting for our purposes is
the so called spatial selection: when cooperators form clusters they are more
likely to grow and thus prevail in competition with defectors, whereas when
13
cooperators and defectors are uniformly distributed the defectors usually win
out. This is in total agreement not only with the results of Helbing and Yu,
but also with the logic of group selection: as Darwin himself wrote [32], “a
tribe including many members who . . . were always ready to aid one another,
and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over
most other tribes; and this would be natural selection”.
Inspired by these findings, we further modified our model including also the
possibility for a player to change his own behaviour by means of imitation, i.e.
through some kind of herding mechanism. At each time step, a given player Pi
will be randomly selected as in the previous simulations. Now, however, before
playing his turn according to his own nature (altruistic or selfish), player Pi
will look at all the others and will find the richest one, say Pj: if player Pj
is richer than player Pi, player Pi will adopt with probability γ = 0.01 the
strategy (i.e. the altruistic or selfish behaviour) of player Pj. As a consequence
of this mechanism, the composition of the population will change over time
and our aim is precisely to study this evolution.
First, let us take into consideration the case of AS model, where altruistic
players are naive. We already know that naive altruism is a loosing strategy
in terms of capital, so we expect that selfish behaviour will spread throughout
the whole community. Therefore, we set the initial conditions so that 99% of
the population is altruistic and only 1% is selfish. The results of the simula-
tions are shown in the three panels of Figure 11.
The plot in the top panel immediately confirms our expectations. In fact, the
fraction of altruists steadily decreases in time from its initial value, 0.99, and
asymptotically goes to zero, while selfishness rapidly “infects” the entire pop-
ulation. This also means that in this model, where people tend to imitate the
richest players, naive altruism has no possibility to survive.
In the middle panel we see the corresponding initial evolution (until turn 300)
of the average capital, calculated for the whole community and, separately, for
the two categories of players. The altruists’ capital is initially almost constant
(actually, looking at numerical data, one can appreciate a slight increase),
but very soon starts to decrease and then maintains a negative slope. That is
because in the first turns there are few selfish players draining the capital of
altruistic players, but the selfish group starts soon to grow in number and so
altruistic players lose capital with their donations. On the other hand, selfish
players have from the beginning an increasing capital, because they can en-
joy all the advantages of the altruists presence. They are successful because
they gain capital at the expense of altruists, so they are imitated by poorer
altruists and grow in number. However, at around turn 150, altruistic players
become too few to ensure selfish players an increasing capital, therefore selfish
players start to lose capital too. Consequently, also the average capital of the
collective group follows a similar evolution and, after an initial small increase,
it starts to decrease.
If one wants to see the global evolution of the capital over the entire simu-
lation, this is plotted in the bottom panel. We stopped at turn 1000 because
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Fig. 11. Effects of imitation in AS model. Time evolution of a community
composed of selfish players and of naively altruistic ones, where the new mechanism
of imitation is present. We can see how the different capitals change over time, as
well as the composition of the population. There are N = 10, 000 players that take
part in the game, with  = 0.005 and γ = 0.01. The results are averaged over 50
realizations. See text for further details.
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after that there are no substantial changes. In this panel we do not plot the
evolution of capital of altruistic players, because after turn 300 their number
becomes too low to have a stable average over the different realizations. We
can see that the decreasing trend of both the collective group capital and the
selfish group capital continues well after turn 300. Finally, at about 800 turns,
the two averages tend to coincide, as we expect for a population made up
entirely of selfish players.
Summarizing, we have found that, at the beginning, naive altruism seems
favourable for the entire community, even if unfavourable for the altruists,
because who defects and acts selfishly gets the most advantages. So selfish
players are seen as a winning model and get imitated, causing a spread of
selfish behaviour. In such a way, everyone will eventually become selfish and
care only about himself. However, none of the players can win if playing alone.
Therefore, all the players end up losing capital — the worst situation for the
whole community. Selfishness, even if initially profitable at the individual level,
ultimately turns out not to be a winning strategy at the global level.
After having studied the outcome of competition between selfishness and naive
altruism in AS model, as a second step we took again into consideration SAS
model, where selective altruists donate capital only to other altruists. We
wanted to check whether such a more robust form of altruism spreads or not
throughout the entire community, so we performed a new set of simulations
starting this time from an initial condition with 99% of selfish players and
1% of selectively altruistic ones. The results are plotted in the three panels of
Figure 12.
In the top panel we immediately see that the situation is the opposite of the
previous one: now it is the altruism that rapidly diffuses among the popula-
tion. In fact, starting from the value of 0.01, the fraction of altruistic play-
ers strongly increases and then asymptotically tends to 1. Selective altruism
seems, therefore, the preferred behaviour and for this reason it is imitated by
the majority of the players.
In the middle panel we zoom on the first 300 turns of time evolution of the
three average capitals of interest. Selfish players’ capital presents an evident
decrease, that stays almost constant along all the considered interval. It hap-
pens because they are now cut away from the network of capital exchange:
they do not gain by altruists donations and, playing only game B, they are
stuck in a losing trend. On the other hand, altruistic players have a small
gain from the beginning, because even when they are in a small number they
manage to exchange capital between them (but only between them) and ob-
tain a positive effect on game B. Mutual aid gives an advantage to altruistic
players and makes them almost immediately richer than selfish ones, so the
former are regarded by other players as a winning model and are imitated,
growing in number. The average capital of the collective group has another
trend: it initially decreases and then, around turn 40, starts to increase. That
is because initially almost all the players are selfish and lose capital, but when
more and more players become altruistic and have an increasing capital, col-
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Fig. 12. Effects of imitation in SAS model. Time evolution of a community
composed of selfish players and of selectively altruistic ones, where the new mech-
anism of imitation is present. We can see how the different capitals change over
time, as well as the composition of the population. There are N = 10, 000 players
that take part in the game, with  = 0.005 and γ = 0.01. The results are averaged
over 50 realizations. See text for further details.
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lective capital also starts to grow.
Finally, in the bottom panel, we plot the whole evolution of the system. Again,
we stopped at turn 1000 because there are no significant changes after that.
Selfish players’ capital is not plotted for the same reason as before, because
after a certain time there is not a sufficient number of them. It can be seen
that collective and altruists capitals continue their increasing trend. From the
beginning, selfish players join the altruistic faction, but being poorer than
the players they join, they initially slow the increase of average capital of the
altruistic group. At last, when almost all the players are altruistic, the two
average capitals become equal and the increasing trend has a constant slope.
To summarize the situation with different words, we have seen that selective
altruism is the winning behaviour: this kind of altruists can help each other
and thus gain capital, without being “robbed” by the selfish. Besides, they give
a positive image to selfish players, who sooner or later decide to follow their
example and have a kind of “social improvement”, becoming altruistic. In the
end, all the players help each other and have a positive trend of increasing
capital — the ideal situation for the whole community.
5 Exploring different topologies
In the previous sections we always considered a fully interacting community of
altruistic and selfish players {Pi}i=1,2,...,N , where each of them interacts with
every one else. In this section we want to explore what happens if a given
player Pi can interact only with a limited number of neighbours, like in a real
social network (in this respect, the fully interacting community is equivalent
to an all-to-all network). In other words, for both AS and SAS models with
imitation, we study here the influence of the network topology on the evolution
of cooperation in our community of players and on the emergence of different
patterns of collective behaviours. In practice, once selected a given network
topology, a player Pi who plays game A can, now, donate capital only to a
player Pj belonging to his neighbourhood {Pj}j=1,2,...,ki (being ki the degree of
player Pi), and the same rule holds for imitation: each player can look only at
his neighbours and eventually imitate the strategy of the richest one among
them.
To understand the importance of topology in this collective game, we tested
our model over four different types of networks, that can be seen in Figure 13.
• The regular lattice is, in our case, an ensemble of players arranged like a
2-dimensional square lattice (with open boundary conditions), where every
site is connected only to its four nearest neighbours.
• The small-world network is obtained from the regular lattice, rewiring at
random every pair of links with a probability p = 0.02. It has two remarkable
properties: a small distance between nodes (like a random network) and a
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(a) Regular (b) Small-World
(c) Random (d) Scale-Free
Fig. 13. Different topologies. In the four panels we report four examples of the
network topologies we adopt in this section. For a better visualization, we show
networks with N = 100 nodes, while in the simulations we considered N = 1936.
Blue nodes represent selfish players, while yellow nodes represent altruistic ones.
high clustering coefficient (like a regular lattice) [30].
• The random network is created by adding at each step a new node, con-
nected to a randomly chosen old node (it is often represented as a circle).
• Finally, the scale-free network is created by a mechanism called “preferen-
tial attachment”: at each step a new node is added and is connected to the
existing nodes with a probability proportional to their degree. This mecha-
nism produces a degree distribution that follows a power law [31] (we again
represent the network as a circle and the most connected nodes are drawn
inside it).
In the following, the size of each considered network will always be ofN = 1936
players (even if, for a better visualization, the sizes represented in the figures
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(a) t = 0 (b) t = 2 (c) t = 10
(d) t = 100 (e) t = 1000 (f) t = 10000
Fig. 14. Regular lattice. Graphic representation of the evolving ensemble of players
on a regular lattice topology for SAS model. For a better visualization, we adopt a
network with N = 961 players portraied at 6 different times (turns per player).
At t = 0, one half of the population (chosen at random in the lattice) is selfish,
whereas the other half is selectively altruistic. Colours have the same meaning as
in Figure 13. For yellow (altruistic) nodes, a dark shade of colour means that the
capital of the player is positive, whereas a light shade indicates a null or negative
capital.
will be usually smaller). Besides, we made another change to our model: to
have a faster evolution, we set γ = 1 in the herding process, meaning that
imitation is certain if conditions on capital are fulfilled.
Let us start by considering SAS model in the regular lattice. Given an initial
population of selfish (blue nodes) and selective altruistic (yellow nodes) play-
ers, we observed that its composition evolves during time and asymptotically
reaches a final stable condition with some interesting emergent patterns. Just
to give an example of this process, in Figure 14 we report some subsequent
snapshots of a single simulation run: the sudden evolution at the very first
instants of time becomes slower and slower and the system tends to reach a
steady state, where the (selfish or altruistic) strategy of the players does not
change any more. Actually, if we compare panels (e) and (f), we can see that
the colour composition is almost the same but, on the other hand, a visible
difference still holds about capital: in fact, many altruistic poor players (light
yellow) have become richer (dark yellow), and the surviving poor altruists tend
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Fig. 15. Regular lattice. Final percentage of altruists (taken at time 10,000) as a
function of their initial percentage. We consider AS and SAS models with imitation.
There are N = 1936 players, which can be selfish or (selectively or naively) altruistic,
arranged in a square lattice. The results are averaged over 20 realizations, so we
report the averaged values together with bars indicating their standard deviations.
to surround clusters of selfish players or to occupy the borders of the lattice.
It is interesting to explore in deeper detail these stationary emerging patterns
of cooperation. In order to do this, we varied the initial percentage of altruistic
players from 1% to 99% and, for each value, we calculated the corresponding
value of the final steady percentage of altruists for both AS and SAS models.
We repeated each simulation over 20 different events and report in Figure 15
the averaged values of this quantity together with its standard deviation. The
results show that, in the case of naive altruism, the final percentage of altruists
is always zero — the same result that we found for the all-to-all network. On
the other hand, in the case of selective altruism, plotted data form a peculiar
curve, meaning that the final percentage of altruists strictly depends on the
initial percentage. This is a completely different situation with respect to the
all-to-all network, where the final outcome (an entirely altruistic population)
was independent of the initial composition of the population. Introducing a
lattice topology has, evidently, the effect of preventing a complete diffusion
of selective altruism, creating a level of saturation that depends on the ini-
tial composition. Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous figure, the
final stationary state of the system presents interesting patterns of altruism-
selfishness.
In order to better understand the origin of these patterns in SAS model, we
report in Figure 16 the final composition of the population for four different
values of the initial percentage of selective altruists in a regular lattice with
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(a) 5% (b) 10%
(c) 20% (d) 50%
Fig. 16. Regular lattice. In the four panels we report four examples of the final
composition of population (at time 10,000) obtained from four initial percentages
of altruists (5%, 10%, 20% and 50%) in SAS model. There are 961 players, which
can be selfish or selectively altruistic, arranged in a square lattice. Colours have the
same meaning as in Figure 14.
a smaller number of nodes (961), for a better visualization. Besides, in Fig-
ure 17, we show six enlargements of some significant patterns emerging from
the previous figure. As one immediately sees, in all the cases presented in
Figure 16, the final outcome is a situation in which the two groups are highly
segregated and form stable clusters. We could ask why, after some time, the
two groups get stuck in these frozen configurations. The answer comes from a
careful look at the figures.
If we look at Figure 17, in panels (a) and (b) we can see two examples of clus-
ters (an altruistic one and a selfish one) surrounded by players of the other
group, while in panels (c) and (d) we can see two examples of analogous clus-
ters at the edge of the system. It results that altruists in the inner parts of
altruistic clusters tend to be rich, while those at the border of a selfish or an
altruistic cluster tend to be poor. This comes from the fact that an altruist
that is surrounded by 4 altruists has a 1/2 probability of donating capital
(that is the probability of chosing game A), while having at least an equal
probability of receiving a donation. So, an internal altruist does not lose capi-
tal as a consequence of donation mechanism and, simultaneously, he tends to
gain by means of game B. On the other hand, an altruist at the border of a
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 17. Regular lattice. Several meaningful enlargements of patterns found in
Figure 16.
given (altruistic or selfish) cluster is surrounded by less than 4 altruists. He
still has a 1/2 probability of donating capital, but now he has a smaller proba-
bility of receiving a donation so, due to this unfavourable balance, he tends to
lose capital. The same also happens, for analogous reasons, to altruists at the
edge of the system, who therefore tend to be poor (as clearly visible in panel
(d) of Figure 16). As a consequence of this effect, selfish players at the border
of a cluster can see only poorer altruistic players and therefore never imitate
them, thus remaining frozen in their selfish state. On the other hand, poor
altruistic players at the border of a cluster have to face richer selfish players,
but at the same time they are in contact with internal altruistic players that
are richer than those selfish players, so altruistic players at the border con-
tinue to imitate their richer fellows and remain altruistic. Summarizing, such
a complex dynamics fully explains the stability of the clusters of cooperators
or defectors observed in panels (a–d) of Figure 17. Finally, in panel (e) we can
see that the smallest stable pattern of altruists is a cross (in fact, an isolated
altruist, having no neighbours to exchange capital with, will inevitably end
to disappear), while in panel (f) we can see that even a single isolated selfish
player can survive.
After the regular lattice, let us take into consideration the other topologies for
both AS and SAS models. For the small-world network, we performed anal-
ogous simulations in order to evaluate the final percentage of altruists as a
function of the initial one. The results are reported in Figure 18. We can see
that the situation is practically the same as in the regular lattice, both in the
case of naive and selective altruism. In other terms, rewiring some of the links
of the regular lattice does not produce a significant change on the global dif-
fusion of altruism. Only, the shape of stable selfish and altruistic patterns can
be deformed by the presence of long range links with respect to the regular
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Fig. 18. Small-world network. Plot of the final percentage of altruists (taken
at time 10,000) as a function of their initial percentage. We consider AS and SAS
models with imitation. There are N = 1936 players, which can be selfish or altruistic,
arranged in a small-world topology. The results are averaged over 20 realizations and
we report the averaged values together with bars indicating their standard deviations.
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Fig. 19. Random network. Plot of the final percentage of altruists (taken at time
10,000) as a function of their initial percentage. We consider AS and SAS models
with imitation. There are N = 1936 players, which can be selfish or altruistic,
arranged in a random network. The results are averaged over 20 realizations and we
report the averaged values together with bars indicating their standard deviations.
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Fig. 20. Scale-free network. Plot of the final percentage of altruists (taken at time
300, since in this topology convergence is very fast) as a function of their initial
percentage. We consider AS and SAS models with imitation. There are N = 1936
players, which can be selfish or altruistic, arranged in a scale-free network. The
results are averaged over 20 realizations and we report the averaged values together
with bars indicating their standard deviations.
lattice topology.
In Figure 19 we can see the results for the random network topology. Selective
altruism has a final diffusion that is similar to the one found for the regular
lattice and for the small-world network. The only unexpected result is that,
in this topology, naive altruism does not tend to disappear. On the contrary,
its final percentage is nearly equal to the initial one. Examining the details of
time evolution, we found that in this case, for a given starting percentage of
altruists, there is an initial sudden decrease of altruistic players immediately
followed by an increase of the same order. Therefore their final percentage
remains almost unchanged.
The last considered topology is the scale-free network, whose results are re-
ported in Figure 20. Again, we see that the percentage of naive altruists does
not evolve to zero. In particular, for an initial percentage above 20% the final
percentage is always near 100% but, for smaller initial percentages, there are
some realizations in which the final percentage is near 100% and other ones in
which it is near 0%. Taking the average value over 200 different realizations,
we obtain the curve that we can see in the left part of the panel. We do not
report error bars because there is not a distribution of values around the most
likely value, but only a binary outcome (0% or 100%). It seems that a value
near 20% can play the role of a threshold for the initial percentage of altruistic
players one needs to have in order to observe a complete diffusion of altruism
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on a scale-free network community, but this feature surely deserves a deeper
analysis which will be done elsewhere. Finally, in the case of selective altruism,
the number of altruists always increases to almost the entire population, thus
giving rise, in average, to a constant final percentage of altruists for any initial
condition.
Conclusions
In this work we investigated altruism in two modified versions of collective
games exploiting Parrondo’s paradox. First, we considered a modified version
of Toral’s model, the AS model, showing that a small fraction of altruistic
players can give a winning trend to the whole community of fully interacting
people. However, those naive altruistic players help others at their own ex-
pense: while selfish players can enjoy a big gain of capital, altruistic players
suffer a big loss. In this situation altruism is strongly discouraged. To overcome
this problem, we considered, in the SAS model, a more refined and realistic
way for a player to help other players, a behaviour that we called selective
altruism. The key factor is the process of repeated encounters. In this context,
it means that two players who are connected can play together many times,
so they have a reason to trust each other and help other players that help
them. Simulations showed that selective altruists create a winning trend for
their category, but avoid at the same time to be exploited by selfish players.
The latter are left out from this network of mutual help: they can only play a
losing game and so their capital decreases.
We then introduced imitation in AS and SAS models: all the players can
change their behaviour in time, imitating at each turn the most successful
among them. In this case selfish players prevail against naively altruistic play-
ers, because they have much higher gains, and so all the players sooner or
later become selfish. Conversely, selectively altruistic players obtain higher
gains than selfish ones and are imitated by them, so all the players become
altruistic very soon.
Lastly, we studied the influence of topology on the diffusion of altruism. We
found that some topologies put a limit to the diffusion of selective altruism,
while other topologies allow even naive altruism to diffuse among the popula-
tion. In the particular case of a regular lattice we also discovered interesting
emerging patterns of altruistic and selfish behaviours in the final stationary
configurations of the system. The latter have a simple explanation in terms of
exchanges of capital among players.
In conclusion, by means of extensive numerical simulations with collective
kinds of Parrondo’s games, we showed how, as often observed in real situa-
tions, a community of cooperators can be favoured with respect to a com-
munity of defectors, because cooperation can become a winning strategy for
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the group. With a mechanism of reputation, altruistic players can be aware
of what players are worthy of trust and so they can overcome the negative
effects of being naively altruistic. In this situation, a process similar to natu-
ral selection acts on the population and produces a socio-economic evolution
[11]: altruists become richer, their behaviour is imitated and spreads among
the population, extending in this way its positive effects to all the players.
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